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Beyond Convergence and the New Media Decision:
Regulatory Models in Communications Law 
Melanie J. Mortensen†
regard to the blurring of the distinction between carriageAbstract 
and content. The second model explores the possibilities
involved in the present trend towards generalized regula-hile technological and economic changes have
tory convergence in communications, with its increasedW been the most influential factors in stimulating
reliance upon harmonized competition law and policy.recent policy and regulatory reassessments in Canada
While this direction takes account of technological andwith respect to telecommunications and broadcasting
economic shifts, there is little attention to how publicregulation, public interest and socio-political concerns
interest or socio-political concerns may be adverselyshould also remain significant in the design of new regu-
affected by the trend. The third model, a multi-layered,latory and policy responses to convergence and competi-
object-specific policy and regulatory regime, has beention. When the CRTC announced that it would refrain
proposed herein as an alternative that better accommo-from regulating broadcasting in new media for a period
dates recent shifts in communications due to conver-of five years, this occasion illustrated the increasing inap-
gence and competition. This model is recommended asplicability of the sector-specific legislation from which
an alternative policy strategy whereby regulatory supervi-the mandate of the CRTC is derived.
sion and effective governance are available where appro-
The first model addressed is the present sector-spe- priate. The purpose-specific model also best responds to
cific policy and regulatory treatment of communications, technological, economic, public interest and socio-polit-
which accommodates certain new pressures, such as ical considerations, the balance of which should be con-
increased competition and privatization in the telecom- sidered a guide for adjudicating policy modifications in
munications sector, by using the power to forbear from such essential areas as communications technologies and
regulation. However, this route lacks appropriate treat- the information industry.
ment of technological innovations, particularly with
†B.A., M.A., LL.B., B.C.L. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Richard Gold and Dr. Sunny Handa of the Faculty of Law at McGill
University, as well as her colleagues at Greenspoon Perreault, for their guidance and encouragement. Any errors or omissions, however, are solely the



































































100 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
[T]he phenomenon of convergence calls for complementary explicit guidance for industry stakeholders. Finally, the
analyses of the relations between the different, possibly com- social and cultural significance of communications tech-
peting, authorities which are today given the task of control- nologies require that regulatory models be adaptable toling the domains of telecommunications and of media sepa-
particular needs of users. The multi-layer regulatoryrately. . . . [T]he institutional convergence could be a chance
for a real taking into account of the complexity of the model implements a context for the regulation that tran-
technological convergence whose treatment could as such scends simple economic factors, while also being more
escape specialised authorities which remain distinct. 1 responsive than the present content regulation in broad-
cast law. New media undertakings and the privatization
of regulated industries in telecommunications and
broadcasting contribute to a highly dynamic environ-Introduction 
ment in the development of new policy and regulatory
echnological convergence, privatization and strategies. This paper’s assessment of the three regulatoryT increased competition have led to new challenges models in view of technological, economic, public
for communications law in the last decade. Consequent interest, and socio-political considerations demonstrates
changes in the telecommunications and broadcasting that the flexible and responsive multi-layer model pro-
sectors have given rise to doubts regarding the rationale vides an appealing alternative to current trends in the
for sector-specific legislation. The Canadian Radio-televi- policy and regulation of communications in Canada.
sion and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC),
which provides the policy guidance and implementation
of the laws that govern communications technologies in
Policy Instability in the CurrentCanada, recently issued a significant decision regarding
new media undertakings, exempting them from regula- Communications Regulatory
tion for five years. When combined with the erosion of Environment 
the boundary between telecommunications and broad-
casting, as well as the increasing reliance upon competi- he regulatory environment for communications
tion law to govern where the CRTC has forborne from T typically develops in response to a variety of stimuli
regulation, the five-year abstention from regulation with and challenges. These influences may be classified by
respect to the new media illustrates a fundamental four broad categories: (1) technological, (2) economic, (3)
problem that exists with respect to the regulatory frame- public interest, and (4) socio-political. Shifts in regulatory
work for communications in Canada in light of the par- policy have thus traditionally occurred when one of
allel phenomena of convergence and competition. these elements has changed in an evident way. Further-
more, regional differences in the amalgamation of influ-To address this problem, three regulatory models
ences help account for the legitimate distinctions inare assessed in this paper to determine their relative
communications regulatory policy from nation tosuccess in meeting the challenges of convergence that
nation.arise in the context of the potential regulation of new
media in Canada. The first is the present sector-specific At present, the four categories of influences are in
demarcation between telecommunications and broad- flux on a global scale, but with different concentration
casting, with its trend toward forbearance in the areas and emphases. Technological innovation and the con-
that are gradually being privatized. The second is the vergence of media and carrier abilities are shifting the
convergence model, which emphasizes competition; in field with respect to communications and making
many ways, the economic aspects of this model are cur- former sector-specific regulatory distinctions increasingly
rently being incorporated in the existing sector-specific redundant. The global move toward privatization and
regulatory model. The third is a multi-layered, or object- competition in the provision of telecommunications is
specific, regulatory regime. This paper recommends the shifting the economic field and rationale for regulation.
latter model, as it provides a focus that is missing in Thus, where there had been controlled monopolies in
policy debates emphasizing convergence. Furthermore, it the provision of telecommunications services, there is
more ably accommodates the various challenges raised now deregulation, with an increased dependency upon
by the phenomena of convergence and competition. competition law to make up for the shortcomings of the
privatized sector. Members of the public are involved inIndeed, regulatory and policy turbulence is not
these changes both as consumers and as potential partici-unique to Canada. Different nations and communities of
pants in the policy development process. The publicnations are similarly in the process of adjusting to, first,
interest and the notion of universal access are significantthe technological changes of converging, emergent tech-
factors in the regulatory policy of many nations, butnologies; second, the requirements of international trade
these concepts are increasingly overlooked in the movecommitments; and, third, the rise in competition and
toward the increasingly market-based treatment of tele-privatization of the telecommunications sector. The
communications, as William Melody indicates:object-specific, multi-layer regulatory model is more
adaptable to the international commitments to which There are two primary perspectives that require representa-


































































Regulatory Models in Communications Law 101
is the perspective of those groups in society that may be combinations of prominent influences, each of the influ-
significantly affected by the policies adopted, but who do ences should be included when new regulatory policy is
not have a sufficiently organized financial vested interest to developed, or old regulatory policies are refurbished, tomount a representation.. . . The second perspective is that of
ensure that the balance of responses is maintained, evensociety as a whole, focusing directly on the overall structure
of benefits, costs, and consequences for society. This perspec- if particular influences have not shifted and would there-
tive would examine these consequences that lie outside the fore appear less relevant to regulators. 5 This paper shall
normal realm of special interest decision makers and would therefore assess the three different regulatory and policyinclude an evaluation of economic externality, social and
models to determine their relative advantages and disad-cultural consequences of policy options. 2
vantages in treating technological, economic, public
The socio-political field is thus shifting as interna- interest, and socio-political concerns.
tional agreements and transnational bodies develop
increased authority over the implementation of commu-
nications. Indeed, we may therefore understand that Regulation of Communications in Canada
‘‘what is missing from these discussions . . . is a concep- Canadian communications are managed and super-
tion of how the regulatory changes, given the technolog- vised by the CRTC. The governing legislation is pres-
ical shift, will affect democratic values shared by many of ently arranged according to a sector-specific model that
the countries posed with the regulatory quandaries of divides the carriage and content of communications as
convergence’’. 3 Simultaneously, previously less con- telecommunications and broadcasting, respectively. The
nected developing nations are joining the international CRTC is a Canadian independent tribunal created in
communications infrastructures, which forces attention 19766 to ensure compliance with the Canadian Tele-
on the disparity in requirements and puts into question communications Act7 and Broadcasting Act. 8 These stat-
the rationale for capitalist models of communications utes are the responsibility of separate Ministries: Industry
service provision. 4 Regulatory shifts respond to particular Canada is responsible for the Telecommunications Act,
alterations in the balance of the four categories of influ- while Heritage Canada is responsible for the Broad-
ences. Responsive and responsible communications casting Act. The overlapping jurisdiction of the tradi-
policy requires the accommodation of technological, tional split between carriage and content of information
economic, public interest, and socio-political influences in the era of convergence makes it particularly advanta-
in the changes to, or development of, regulation, even if geous to have a single regulator, even though the CRTC
there is no apparent shift to cause concern about any has traditionally had a division in its operations. The
particular one category of influence. CRTC is presently restructuring its operations in order
to more effectively respond to the new requirements ofThe regulation of telecommunications and broad-
convergence in the regulated undertakings that it over-casting in Canada, as elsewhere, has developed from the
sees. Indeed, the change of the governance of telecom-relation of the industry players and service providers, the
munications and the creation of the CRTC in the mid-government, and the public in response to how the four
seventies demonstrates the recognition by the govern-categories of influences were perceived. The concomi-
ment that there was a close relation between carriagetant phenomena of convergence and competition have
and content in a ‘‘communications system’’. 9 Further-garnered much attention from regulators in Canada, as
more, the CRTC has an important role with respect toin other nations. There is a move toward uniformity and
Canada’s trade commitments since its existence satisfiesharmonization in the regulation of communications as
the requirement of the World Trade Organizationwell as competition law. Nevertheless, as with most
(WTO) for an independent tribunal to render policyother nations, the situation in Canada remains unique
with respect to telecommunications services.with respect to the particular balance of influences. The
present attention to mainly technological and economic Various principles guide the policy choices of the
influences in the present shifts in regulatory policy in CRTC with respect to its decisions and actions. In gen-
Canada reflects the fact that such shifts are perceived as eral, these principles are commensurate with all of the
having little to do with the Canadian public interest or categories of influences discussed above. The telecom-
the socio-political situation, as these have only changed munications and broadcasting policies for Canada are
minimally in relation to the provision of communica- statutorily enacted by section 7 of the Telecommunica-
tions services in recent years. Clearly, the shifts of influ- tions Act10 and section 3 of the Broadcasting Act. 11 The
ences in Canada are not identical to those of other notable objectives of the Telecommunications Act policy
nations. In developed nations such as the Western Euro- include: orderly development, reliability, accessibility,
pean states, for instance, there is a different balance of efficiency, national and international competitiveness,
prominent influences than in Canada since their socio- Canadian ownership and control, use of Canadian facili-
political shifts with the European Union are altering the ties, innovation, users’ socio-economic status, and per-
political field. Similarly, different influences are evident sonal privacy protection. The main principles included
in certain developing nations as the public develops new in the declaration of policy of the Broadcasting Act are:
relations to communications with increased access to Canadian ownership and control, essential public service


































































102 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
English and French language broadcasting, the affirma- 1999 until 2004. 20 The New Media Decision demon-
tion of various aspects of Canadian attitudes, Canadian strates certain shortcomings in the present sector-specific
content, high standards, and regulation and supervision regulatory scheme of telecommunications and broad-
by a single independent public authority. The references casting. 21 The relative flexibility of the New Media Deci-
to Canadian values or attitudes in the policy are specifi- sion with respect to future policy directions provides an
cally explicated at subsection 3(d) of the Broadcasting opportunity to demonstrate how different regulatory
Act: models could manage the pressures that technological
innovations and transformations in economic strategies(d) the Canadian broadcasting system should
have put on converging, privatizing, and increasingly(i) serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cul-
competitive communications industry participants.tural, political, social and economic fabric of
Canada,
Recent developments have demonstrated the diffi-(ii) encourage the development of Canadian expres-
culty presented by the lacunae in the regulation. Aftersion by providing a wide range of programming
that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, the issuance of the New Media Decision, certain Cana-
values and artistic creativity, by displaying Cana- dian companies began operating Internet sites at which
dian talent in entertainment programming and television signals were retransmitted. One such com-by offering information and analysis concerning
pany, Jumptv.com Canada Inc. (JumpTV), had appliedCanada and other countries from a Canadian
for a licence to do so under the compulsory licence topoint of view,
retransmit television signals provided by section 31 of(iii) through its programming and the employment
the Copyright Act, 22 while the activities of JumpTVopportunities arising out of its operations, serve
the needs and interests, and reflect the circum- seemed to fit the criteria for the CRTC’s exemption from
stances and aspirations, of Canadian men, regulation for new media. Following significant pressure
women and children, including equal rights, the within Canada and from the United States by cablelinguistic duality and multicultural and multira-
television organizations and major content producers, ascial nature of Canadian society and the special
well as a public consultation process on the topic ofplace of aboriginal peoples within that society,
and Internet retransmission, the federal government’s Bill
C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, received royal(iv) be readily adaptable to scientific and technolog-
ical change [. . .] assent on December 12th, 2002. 23 The amendment of
section 31 of the Copyright Act provided thereby effec-Thus, in the enunciation of the Canadian telecom-
tively presented a sector-specific exclusion from the com-munications and broadcasting policies, all four of the
pulsory licensing regime by explicitly excluding newcategories of influences are evident since technological,
media retransmitters from the definition of ‘‘retrans-economic, public interest, and socio-political factors are
mitter’’.included insofar as they are relevant to each sector.
At the international level, a number of international After the passage of Bill C-11, the CRTC issued its
trade commitments affect how the information industry Broadcasting Public Notice 2003-2, 24 which revisited the
is governed. Canada is bound with respect to intellectual New Media Decision in light of the amendment. The
property protection as well as certain aspects of telecom- Internet Retransmission Notice indicated the position of
munications regulation by the TRIPs, 12 FTA,13 NAFTA,14 the CRTC with respect to the specific topic of Internet
GATS,15 and BTA.16 Furthermore, with respect to the retransmission of television signals:
‘‘old’’ telecommunications and broadcasting technolo-
[T]he Commission does not consider it necessary or appro-gies, there are several long-standing agreements in place
priate to require the licensing of Internet retransmitters.that regulate and assist in the control of such media as
Rather, Internet retransmission undertakings should remainradio, telephones and television signals. 17 exempt from these and from other requirements under Part
II of the Broadcasting Act. In addition, since the recentThe CRTC’s ‘‘New Media Report’’ 18 was a policy
amendments to the Copyright Act address the main con-statement on both telecommunications and broad-
cern identified in this proceeding, the Commission sees nocasting that followed public consultation on the regula- need to amend the New Media Exemption Order at this
tion of new media. ‘‘New media’’ was treated quite time. 25
simply as a catch-all for new media undertakings that
primarily involved the provision of services over the Thus, while the exemption continued with respect
Internet. The CRTC subsequently issued an exemption to communications law, the alteration of the governance
order, the ‘‘New Media Decision’’, for new media broad- of the intellectual property rights through a sector-spe-
casting undertakings that indicated that broadcasting cific solution provided a means by which the legislators
regulation would not apply to new media undertak- were able to circumvent the implications of regulating
ings. 19 Since the CRTC has a policy of reviewing its the Internet through communications law. The sector-
decisions every five years, and decided it would not be specific nature of the exemption, however, in the legisla-
appropriate to review sooner in these circumstances, it tion of intellectual property rights, may set a dubious
follows that new media undertakings are exempt from precedent from the perspective of intellectual property


































































Regulatory Models in Communications Law 103
the regulatory response of the reliance upon forbearanceNew Media and Alternative
to implement competition and the partnership with thePolicy and Regulatory Models for
Competition Bureau, fails to address the growing unsuit-Communications ability of sector-specific laws in the context of conver-
gence.hree different models of policy and regulatory strat-T egies present alternatives for treating communica- Technological changes are making the sector-spe-tions in the current climate of technological innovation. cific legislation obsolete because the distinctionsEach of these three models will be described in relation between telecommunications and broadcasting activitiesto its current implementation and reception in commu- and undertakings are growing less distinct. At the samenications policy doctrine. A practical description of how time, there is a push toward privatization of communica-the new media would be regulated according to each tions markets, particularly as the industry players aremodel demonstrates the degree to which each model similarly engaged in business convergence in order toassures that the categories of technological, economic, better compete. Thus, the rise in competition and priva-public interest, and socio-political concerns are accom- tization draws attention away from the fundamentalmodated. The first model is the current, sector-specific changes that have been occurring in communications, astreatment of communications in policy and law that it is made to appear to be simply an evolution in thedivides broadcasting and telecommunications. It demon- technology in a field that is now, therefore, ready forstrates a moderate degree of success in accommodating competition. 27 The substantive preservation of the con-the concerns as they have been assured in the past, but is tent/carriage model does not accommodate the kinds ofweak with respect to the attention to technological influ- policy considerations that arise with the shift in signifi-ences. The second model reflects current trends in com- cance of communications technologies. It is true that thismunications deregulation, emphasizing the convergence regulatory model was certainly representative, at onethat blurs the distinction between broadcasting and tele- time, of the reality of certain kinds of information trans-communications, and looks to greater competition in a mission; their attendant policies addressed the concernscommercialized communications sector. It demonstrates that arose with the significance of each branch to eco-flexibility with respect to technological and economic nomic stakeholders and the public. New kinds of com-concerns, but is weak in the areas of public interest and, munications technologies give rise to new relationsespecially, socio-political concerns. The third model is among the public, the technologies, and the manner bybased on theoretical proposals that would take commu- which information is transmitted, carried, processed, andnications policy in a different direction than current received.trends and would instead be based on purpose-specific
regulation. The third model is recommended since it While the CRTC made definitive policy statements
facilitates the flexible, yet balanced accommodation of on convergence, its New Media Decision demonstrated
the four categories of influences, allows for competition a unique stopgap procedure. By effectively indicating it
where appropriate, and is more versatile with respect to would ‘‘wait and see’’, the CRTC provided itself with
the public interest and socio-political influences when time to shift its policies and procedures to respond to the
different communications requirements create unique industry and international pressures brought about by
policy and regulatory environments. technological convergence and the demand for industry
competition. Indeed, the New Media Decision is particu-
Regulatory Model One: Sector-Specific larly instructive since it reflects the sector-specific divi-
Legislation and the Status Quo sion and the CRTC’s recognition of the effect of techno-
logical convergence and the insufficiency, or perhapsThe regulatory model presently used in Canada is
growing inadequacy, of the sector-specific communica-sector-specific legislation, which creates a distinction
tions laws.between telecommunications and broadcasting. While
some jurisdictions collapse the two, the underlying dis- With respect to telecommunications, the following
crete treatments of carriage and content often subsist. It description of the New Media Decision underscores this
is important to note that even though convergence and difficulty:
the greater privatization and commercialization of tele-
Noteworthy for telecommunications purposes, the CRTCcommunications and broadcasting are taking effect in
confirmed in the Report on New Media that Internet Ser-Canada, as yet there has been no true shift away from
vice Providers (‘‘ISPs’’) are not required to own or operatethis regulatory model. Instead, there has been an increase their own transmission facilities in order to provide Internet
by the CRTC in forbearing from regulation where it is services. ISPs operating in Canada thus continue to have the
deemed appropriate. It is clear that the present delinea- choice to offer Internet services using transmission facilities
leased from other carriers, or to build or purchase their owntion of communications law has been regarded as less
transmission facilities. An ISP that does the former is analo-tenable given the last decade of technological develop-
gous to a ‘‘reseller’’ and is not subject to direct CRTC regula-ments and likely future innovations in communications. tion, whereas an ISP which owns or operates transmission
The maintenance of the same system despite technolog- facilities would have the status of a telecommunications


































































104 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
requirements and other forms of direct CRTC regulation introduction of different and new ways of transporting
under the Telecommunications Act. 28 and transmitting communications have created a turbu-
By contrast, the New Media Decision made the lent situation regarding various policy developments.
following distinctions with respect to broadcasting: The growing obscurity of the distinction between con-
tent and carriage renders the legislative differentiation(i) predominantly alphanumeric services, (ii) ‘‘customizable
content’’ (i.e. content allowing end-users to create their own between broadcasting and telecommunications mean-
uniquely tailored content), and (iii) other content. The ingless. 31 It has been suggested by some, such as Bernard
CRTC concluded that material in categories (i) and (ii) is Clements, that a single, general communications regula-not broadcasting, whereas material in content (iii) does fall
tory model should therefore be developed:within the definition of broadcasting. The CRTC deter-
mined that new media content on the Internet that is An instinctive approach might be to create a new category
broadcasting should be exempted from regulation under of ‘‘multimedia’’ services for which a suitable regulatory
section 9(4) of the Broadcasting Act on the basis that regula- framework could be devised.. . . [I]f a regulatory approach
tion would not contribute to the achievement of the Broad- cannot be developed in isolation of current frameworks,
casting Act policy objectives. 29 there is a danger that existing regulation might be extended
inappropriately to the new environment. One solutionThe CRTC based its decision on its findings that
might be to take a completely fresh approach, with provi-significant Canadian new media content exists on the sions for migrating from today’s regulatory framework to a
Internet, that there is no evidence of a problem future unified regime. 32
regarding the visibility of Canadian new media content,
Furthermore, it has also been argued that the rise inand that the new media industry is taking steps to ensure
competition makes the regulation of the communica-the continued strong Canadian presence on the
tions industry unnecessary, and shifts the responsibilityInternet. 30 Nevertheless, these changes do not alter the
of governance to competition law.33 Concerns about thisfact that the sector-specific legislation may in fact be
trend often arise in telecommunication policy analyses,unsuitable to current and possible innovations in com-
such as the following observations by Colin Scott:munications.
Increasingly, there is pressure to treat telecommunicationsThe framework characterized by sector-specific leg-
for regulatory purposes as part of the broader informationislation and an increasing dependency on the power to society apparatus, attempting to develop common regimesforbear from regulation performs somewhat adequately for the economic and content regulations aspects of broad-
with respect to public interest and socio-political factors. casting, computing and telecommunications. Most general
is the broadly characterized shift from detailed sectoral rulesIt also facilitates economic growth by competition where
to broad competition/antitrust rules as the basis for regula-it does not regulate, but fails to adequately respond to
tion. 34technological changes. By relying upon increasingly out-
dated distinctions, the sector-specific regulatory scheme This single communications regulatory model
fails to provide a flexible response to the increasingly would therefore likely follow the present trend in com-
interactive and technologically advanced communica- munications and facilitate greater privatization and com-
tions environment. With respect to economic factors, the petition. It would determine the circumstances by which
sector-specific model incorporates the rise in privatiza- regulation would be deemed necessary, and move
tion and competition in two ways: by forbearance from toward a greater deregulation of much of the communi-
regulation and the reliance upon competition law to cations industry.
police market abuse. While this permits a certain
Clearly, competition law is another area of law thatamount of flexibility to the industry participants, it
is becoming more important in this era of convergencerequires the arduous process of applying for forbearance
in communications technologies. The shift toward com-where the regulations are presently applicable. On the
petition is definitely under way, which places Canada inother hand, new media undertakings that are presently
a transitional position with respect to the CRTC’s regula-exempt from regulation face a regulatory lacuna that will
tion of telecommunications and the Competitionbecome increasingly significant as the end of the five-
Bureau’s jurisdiction over the open market. 35 The Com-year period of exemption draws to a close. This situation
petition Act36 identifies the practices that are subject tohas not yet been remedied. With respect to both the
review by the Competition Tribunal, ‘‘notably the abusepublic interest and socio-political considerations, the pre-
of a dominant position and entering into anti-competi-sent policies in the sector-specific regulation provide ade-
tive mergers ’’. 37 There are important distinctionsquate protection. Where there has been forbearance
between the sector-specific legislation that governs tele-from regulation, on the other hand, such policy may not
communications as discussed above and the ‘‘technologi-be so easily imposed.
cally neutral’’ competition law.38 Competition law does
not have the same kinds of policy objectives as those
Regulatory Model Two: Convergence and espoused in the Telecommunications Act. Instead, the
Competition Competition Act is intended to ‘‘assist in the restoration
Changes in technology have given rise to most of of competitive conditions’’ where markets are monopoly
the legislative shifts in communications law and policy or oligopoly, and to prevent anti-competitive acts, or the


































































Regulatory Models in Communications Law 105
of identical responses. At the same time, competition policytion law is appropriate to governing ‘‘a highly dynamic
must not be viewed as a cure-all capable of permanenttelecommunications industry’’ since it is not based on
solutions. The WTO cannot expect competition principleseroding technological distinctions and so would likely that may be developed for audio-visual services, or for any
be very active in the emerging communications other convergence-related sector, to have immediate and
profound effects on competition throughout the convergingsystem.40
industries. 45The converged regulatory model provides certain
benefits, particularly in comparison to the sector-specific Nevertheless, there are also drawbacks to this regu-
legislation. The notional basis of the legislation would be latory model. Since the legislation would no longer be
more adaptable to the kinds of innovations that may sector-specific, it would be necessary to ensure that it
arise in communications: ‘‘Regulatory dichotomies work would be adaptable to new and emerging communica-
best when technological categories remain discrete and tions technologies and information transmission media.
absolute . . . [but] they surely do not work when techno-
At present, the CRTC is implementing changes inlogical convergence results in porous service categories
response to technological convergence that reflect theand diversification by operators’’. 41 With respect to tech-
regulatory shifts that are required to accommodate inno-nological problems that are raised by convergence, it has
vations in communications. The changes in the CRTCbeen suggested that the problem of ‘‘bottlenecks’’, for
structure itself provide encouragement to those com-instance, could be suitably regulated by self-regulation
mentators who recommend moving toward a unifiedwithin the industry in concert with competition policy.
regulatory model. Also, the New Media Decision dem-The move toward a market-based scheme may stimulate
onstrates the rising indeterminacy of the telecommuni-greater innovation and allow a more efficient interna-
cations and broadcasting distinction where the applica-tional environment for a uniform system of telecommu-
tion of the regulation is forborne. With the approach ofnications service provision. 42 The reduction of national
the New Media Decision’s expiry date — though it mayregulation in the field of communications may create
be renewed — a legislative solution to the problemsmore consistency internationally as it reduces the possi-
raised by technological convergence would ideally bebility of contradictory rules. Indeed, this has been sug-
ready to be harmoniously implemented in the frame-gested as one of the positive consequences of deregula-
work of Canadian communications. As demonstrated bytion in telecommunications.
the Public Notice regarding Internet retransmission dis-
Furthermore, much recent speculation has consid- cussed above, the implementation of certain regulatory
ered the possible international application of competi- responses to convergence in communications technolo-
tion law, and whether multilateral trade agreements gies may arise from the confluence and intersection of
impose competition law principles upon their signato- other laws such as those that govern intellectual property
ries. The Canada 1999 OECD Competition Report indi- rights. Nevertheless, such re-regulation may work to cir-
cates that the Competition Bureau has been active in a cumvent the application of the stated policy objectives in
WTO working group ‘‘examining the interaction communications law.
between trade and competition policy’’:
The comprehensive viewpoint allowed by the anal-Rather than continue with the ad hoc approach to competi-
tion policy reflected in recent WTO agreements, the Bureau ysis of this particular regulatory model according to the
has been active in examining the viability of establishing a technological, economic, public interest and socio-polit-
sound multilateral framework at the WTO which will ical considerations indicates that while the competitionadvance competition policy internationally. Roundtable dis-
model responds to certain technological and economiccussions with domestic stakeholders on the internationaliza-
concerns, it is weak with respect to public interest andtion of competition policy were conducted by the Eco-
nomics and International Affairs Branch of the Bureau. 43 socio-political concerns. Accordingly, there are two sig-
nificant elements that are relevant with respect to theThe near future will thus likely see a cooperative
policy factors that enter into the reliance upon competi-trans-national framework for negotiating core competi-
tion in the regulation of communications. In the sector-tion law principles, or a broad set of minimum require-
specific legislation, the enumerated policy in each of thements that are established for the regulation of interna-
Telecommunication Act and the Broadcasting Act hadtional competition law problems. 44 This would be useful
similar values at base, but were suited to the kinds ofonce the competition in communications law becomes
considerations that would be relevant to the particularmore stable and established:
sectors. While any treatment of communications in law[T]he importance of cross-sector cooperation in both policy-
would certainly include policy considerations that pro-making and regulation should not be overestimated. In a
nutshell, the best response to technological convergence tected the fundamental values of universal access and the
may be for regulators themselves to converge, across promulgation of Canadian identity and values, the
national borders and, more importantly, across industry sec- greater abstention from regulation in favour of competi-tors. The goal of regulatory convergence should not be
tion makes it seem less likely that such principles wouldhomogenization but rather harmonization. Regulatory


































































106 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
may be deemed as (1) essential and therefore worthy ofRegulatory Model Three: Object-Specific,
rigorous regulation and control, which would corre-Multi-Layered Regulation 
spond to the infrastructure and interface levels of the
In contrast to the present trend in communications five-layer model proposed by Cuilenburg and Verhoest;
law that is moving toward the synthesis of telecommuni- (2) consumer-directed applications, which would be
cations and broadcasting, with a greater reliance on com- open to a certain amount of regulation with respect to
petition law, another model is proposed herein that may what is presently referred to as ‘‘content’’ regulation, yet
serve more specific purposes. A multi-layered regulatory which may in fact be implemented at a self-regulatory
model alters the sector-specific view of communications level, and competition with respect to the provision of
law by changing the focus of the delineation. The tradi- the services; and (3) information transfer services, which
tional split of telecommunications and broadcasting would be more open to deregulation and competition,
reflects the relation between technologies and communi- and which could correspond to carriers and user inter-
cations. Telecommunications refers to the carriage of the faces in the five-layer model described above. However,
communications; broadcasting refers to the content of this breakdown is simply provided as an example of the
the communications. The multi-layered model, on the versatility that should arguably be accorded to appro-
other hand, responds to convergence in a more complex priate levels of supervision and control based on an
way than simply proposing the synthesis of the two appropriate assessment of the technological, economic,
modes. It is true that the effects of technological conver- public interest and socio-political considerations that are
gence confound the traditional split of carriage and con- relevant in a particular jurisdiction or regulatory regime.
tent, but this does not mean that the transmission of
Various benefits flow from this kind of regulatoryinformation should be identically regulated since essen-
and policy framework. Appropriate solutions could betial distinctions remain with respect to their purposes,
crafted that are adequately flexible so as to accommodatewhether for infrastructure, interconnection, or consumer
international commitments in facilitating competition.uses.
Such situations would include flexible negotiation
regarding the applicable criteria for ‘‘essential’’ commu-The discussion of multi-layered models by Jan van
nications services. Indeed, this has been the focus ofCuilenburg and Pascal Verhoest emphasises the variety
many policy discussions involving particular aspects ofof policy and regulatory responses that may be explored
communications service provision such as interconnec-as alternatives in the regulation of convergence in tech-
tion. 50 The multi-level model also facilitates the entry ofnologies and the changes that are occurring in telecom-
new players and innovations, where the emphasis solelymunications. 46 The authors point to and critique the
on competition would likely only favour establishedthree-layer model proposed by the European Green
industry players or strategically merged and thereforePaper on Convergence. 47 This three-layer schema of the
powerful incumbents, so long as they do not threatentelecommunications market makes the following
competition with monopoly practices or other prohib-delineation: (1) infrastructures; (2) carriers; and (3) appli-
ited practices.cations. It marks a departure from viewing telecommuni-
cations as simply infrastructure and applications, as had
To demonstrate how this model would function,been common in Europe at the start of the liberalization
we may examine how new media undertakings wouldof telecommunications. Responding to convergence and
hypothetically be regulated. Where new kinds of servicescompetition, the three-layer model was originally
involving advances in new media undertakings are intro-advanced in a study for the Dutch government in 1990:
duced as a result of technological convergence and‘‘This model combines the idea of different layers within
related developments, a more technically detailed andcommunication with the notion that content provision
rigorous regulatory scheme would allow the purpose ofand exchange is the finality of any telecommunications
the services provided to guide the regulatory response.service’’. 48 Cuilenburg and Verhoest go further to suggest
Thus, regulators would need to determine the kinds ofthat a five-layer model would be more effective. The
services that required more rigorous regulation and pro-three-layer European model is modulated by including
tection.interoperability at two levels of interfaces, so that the
layers are: (1) infrastructures; (2) network interfaces; (3) Indeed, this already occurs in communications with
carriers; (4) user interfaces; and (5) applications. 49 the interconnection and interoperability standards. This
is evident in the following excerpt in relation to its rele-By breaking down the telecommunications model vance to new media and Internet communications:and allowing for the incorporation of what is now sepa-
rately treated as broadcasting, the multi-layer model per- Since the information highway is essentially a network of
networks, interconnectivity is of great importance andmits appropriate treatment for the different purposes of
incompatible standards can delay or obviate interconnec-the communications services that are provided by the
tion at different levels of the information highway, forindustry participants. This may be accomplished by cre- example, between different services, between content prov-
ating legislation that treats the purpose or object of par- iders and services and between alternative channels and


































































Regulatory Models in Communications Law 107
Nevertheless, the establishment of protections for and content, but the move toward deregulation and
basic services and the provision of secure facilities should greater reliance upon competition indicates that there
guide regulators in making decisions as to what is appro- would likely be a lack of regulation where some may be
priate to market-based considerations. Much of the pre- warranted. If competition law becomes the sole arbiter
sent realm of broadcasting, for instance, would be suit- when problems arise, it could lead to a situation where
able to greater competition. While some may argue that new media undertakings would be deterred by the
Canadian content would suffer under such a lack of power held by a market-controlled communications
regulation, this could be an area where standards for self- field. 54
regulation may be developed. Similarly, many commen- The second critique concerns the application of dif-
tators have suggested that restrictions on foreign owner- ferent regulations to different sets of services by the same
ship serve little purpose and should therefore be service provider. The complexity of this scenario none-
removed. 52 Such deregulation indicates an area where theless seems preferable to the present sector-specific reg-
competition might be appropriate. Indeed, many aspects ulatory model, with its increasing grey area between
of what is now categorized as broadcasting are already broadcasting and telecommunications, and the necessity
subject to self-regulation standards. 53 More rigorous reg- to apply for forbearance from regulation on a case-by-
ulation, by contrast, would be appropriate for aspects of case basis. This forbearance may be granted, withheld, or
service provision with respect to network infrastructures, may be limited to only particular aspects of the opera-
interconnection, security services, and information tion of the provision of communications services. Indeed,
databases. With the integration of the Internet in the there is already uncertainty and unpredictability in the
regulation of communications, the assurance of protec- present legislative environment with respect to new
tion by regulation of services based on their purposes media and certain convergent service providers that
may therefore be extended to ensure network protec- could lead to a complex variety of applications of regula-
tion, security and interconnection. tion — or non-regulation, depending on the results of a
Certain criticisms may be levelled against the multi- forbearance decision, or the determination on the appli-
level model. First, the multi-layer model could be criti- cations of either the telecommunications or the broad-
qued since it appears complex. Second, the flexibility of casting regulations. This has been addressed by com-
the regulations based on the purpose of the services may mentary on the consequences of convergence in
also mean that certain substantially similar activities of Canadian communications regulation:
service providers would be subject to different regulatory Technological convergence raises myriad competitive issues
classifications. Third, this model would also likely come that either add to or amplify those raised in the traditional
vertical sectors. It disrupts the conceptual separationunder a great deal of critical scrutiny from the U.S. if it
between the regulated industries at the centre of conver-led to a substantially different regulatory environment
gence — telecommunications and broadcasting — whosefor communications undertakings than exists there. regulators have often been unmindful of the competitive
These critiques will be addressed in turn by comparison impacts of developments in other sectors. For the same
to the first two models. reason, convergence also creates the risk of inconsistent reg-
ulation. Technology-neutral legislation may extend telecom-As compared to the first two models, the multi-level munications and broadcasting regulation to the converging
model may certainly appear more complicated, but it industries indiscriminately, or for different reasons. Alterna-
would create more certainty and uniformity in the areas tively, like services may be excluded from regulation. Con-
flicts are aggravated with respect both to convergence as awhere increased protection would be deemed necessary.
broad phenomenon, and to specific convergence technolo-Furthermore, where there is a sector-specific model, yet a
gies such as Internet telephony, Web broadcasting and con-dependence on the forbearance from regulation where it tent portals. 55
is found to be appropriate, this leads to a situation where
In the second model, fewer problems would arisethe regulations continue to be in operation, while excep-
for new media since whichever more generalized princi-tions are made based on the purposes of the services.
ples guide such new regulations, they would likely beThis could arguably lead to an even more complex situa-
adequate. Thus, there would likely be more clear direc-tion, where new media undertakings — as the five-year
tion in regulation with the development of specific regu-exemption draws to a close — would be required to face
lations for communications services in a converged envi-not only the growing confusion as to the difference
ronment; however, to the extent that these rules willbetween the present sector-specific legislation for tele-
likely be rudimentary and encourage competition, therecommunications and broadcasting, but would also
will not be a great deal of opportunity for specific regula-attempt to present themselves as appropriately forborne
tions to be developed to protect the more essential fea-from regulation. Where there was a multi-layer model,
tures of communications infrastructures and security.the principles that would guide the level of protection or
regulation would be more clearly defined and lead to The third critique involves the reaction and influ-
greater certainty in this regard. With the second model, if ence of the United States with respect to the develop-
there were new media undertakings that had more gen- ment of Canadian communications regulations. It
eral regulation to suit the converged environment, this should be noted that the U.S. is often an influential
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the trade agreements between Canada and the U.S. as ited to those inherent in addressing the associated
well as the recent WTO agreement with respect to trade embryonic markets’’. 57
in telecommunications. 56 However, Canada and the Broader public interest concerns could be better
United States have always differed to a certain extent in protected by the proposed multi-level model since there
the regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting. is no guarantee, either when there has been forbearance
Indeed, it may be argued that there would likely be from regulation or when competition or intellectual
similar results in the multi-level model as compared to property law is left to govern the field, that public
using the sector-specific model, forbearance, and finally interest concerns would be accommodated. The public
the reliance upon competition. With the multi-layer interest concerns, which range from policy considera-
model, however, there would simply be a mechanism by tions presently relevant to telecommunications and
which communications and new media undertakings broadcasting such as universal access to Canadian iden-
may anticipate the regulations that would be applicable tity, could be preserved in the regulation of particular,
to the particular aspects of their services. Furthermore, directed aspects of the provided services. Finally, socio-
there would be a greater protection for the provision of political concerns could be addressed by purpose-specific
essential services without the necessity of relying upon regulation, since protection for the security of Canadian
the interplay of various limitative rules. databases and information security as well as the infra-
structure that provides the basic infrastructure for ser-In the final analysis, the multi-level regulatory
vices provided in Canada could be controlled in thescheme should be assessed according to its success in
specific context of protection and security.accommodating the technological, economic, public
interest, and socio-political influences. This regulatory
framework certainly suits technological advancements, as
the type of regulation would depend upon the nature of Conclusion the particular services. The model is therefore purpose-
specific rather than sector-specific, which permits greater hen the CRTC announced that it would refrain
flexibility in its application to both the old, traditional W from regulating broadcasting in new media for a
communications technologies as well as the innovative period of five years, this occasion illustrated the
new communications technologies and new media increasing inapplicability of the sector-specific legislation
undertakings. The flexibility of the multi-level model from which the mandate of the CRTC is derived. The
creates an approach that may be used in different juris- purpose-specific, multi-level model for the regulation of
dictions, with the particular aspects of the legislation communications technologies proposed by this paper
crafted to suit the particular balance of pertinent consid- offers a coherent alternative to the current trend toward
erations that take precedence in the given jurisdiction. If the governance of communications technologies by
the four fundamental considerations are kept in mind, as competition law. The purpose-specific model also best
well as the regard to the basic purpose of the particular responds to the technological, economic, public interest
communications technology application that is regu- and socio-political considerations, the balance of which
lated, the purpose-specific model would suit the require- should be considered a guide for adjudicating policy
ments of the various perspectives and regulatory jurisdic- modifications in such significant industries as communi-
tions, in contrast to the polarized models that cations technologies. While technological and economic
accommodate either the market-based regimes or the changes have been the most influential factors in stimu-
schemes that are determined solely by the public lating recent policy and regulatory re-evaluation in
interest. Canada with respect to telecommunications and broad-
casting regulation, public interest and socio-political con-With respect to economic influences, the multi-level
cerns should remain significant in the design of newmodel provides a moderate and balanced solution for
regulatory and policy responses to convergence andthe advocates of competition in the telecommunications,
competition. The increasingly essential nature of servicesbroadcasting and converged media sectors. By allowing
provided by and established upon communicationscompetition for appropriate communications technolog-
technologies and new media require that their govern-ical applications and services, this realm would be able to
ance have sound theoretical and rational policy founda-develop with the reliance on the competition model that
tions rather than the simple regulation by default.exists at present. At the same time, rigorous regulation
and industry protection could be reserved for what
would be determined to be essential services. Indeed, it Appendix 1 
would stand to reason that the services that were suited
to competition would benefit from the dependability
Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11 that would result from the protection and regulation of
more essential infrastructure and interconnection levels
in the provision of communications: ‘‘In the context of Broadcasting Policy for Canada 
convergence, regulatory stability will also be essential in Sec. 3. Declaration. (1) It is hereby declared as the broad-



































































Regulatory Models in Communications Law 109
(a) the Canadian broadcasting system shall be effec- (iv) provide a reasonable opportunity for the
tively owned and controlled by Canadians; public to be exposed to the expression of dif-
fering views on matters of public concern, and(b) the Canadian broadcasting system, operating pri-
marily in the English and French languages and (v) include a significant contribution from the
comprising public, private and community ele- Canadian independent production sector;
ments, makes use of radio frequencies that are (j) educational programming, particularly where pro-public property and provides, through its program- vided through the facilities of an independent edu-ming, a public service essential to the maintenance cational authority, is an integral part of the Cana-and enhancement of national identity and cultural dian broadcasting system;sovereignty;
(k) a range of broadcasting services in English and in(c) English and French language broadcasting, while
French shall be extended to all Canadians assharing common aspects, operate under different
resources become available;conditions and may have different requirements;
(l) the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, as the(d) the Canadian broadcasting system should
national public broadcaster, should provide radio
(i) serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the and television services incorporating a wide range of
cultural, political, social and economic fabric of programming that informs, enlightens and enter-
Canada, tains;
(ii) encourage the development of Canadian (m) the programming provided by the Corporation
expression by providing a wide range of pro- should
gramming that reflects Canadian attitudes,
(i) be predominantly and distinctively Canadian,opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity, by
displaying Canadian talent in entertainment (ii) reflect Canada and its regions to national and
programming and by offering information regional audiences, while serving the special
and analysis concerning Canada and other needs of those regions,
countries from a Canadian point of view,
(iii) actively contribute to the flow and exchange
(iii) through its programming and the employ- of cultural expression,
ment opportunities arising out of its opera-
(iv) be in English and in French, reflecting thetions, serve the needs and interests, and reflect
different needs and circumstances of each offi-the circumstances and aspirations, of Cana-
cial language community, including the par-dian men, women and children, including
ticular needs and circumstances of Englishequal rights, the linguistic duality and mul-
and French linguistic minorities,ticultural and multiracial nature of Canadian
society and the special place of aboriginal peo- (v) strive to be of equivalent quality in English and
ples within that society, and in French,
(iv) be readily adaptable to scientific and techno- (vi) contribute to shared national consciousness
logical change; and identity,
(e) each element of the Canadian broadcasting system (vii) be made available throughout Canada by the
shall contribute in an appropriate manner to the most appropriate and efficient means and as
creation and presentation of Canadian program- resources become available for the purpose,
ming; and
(f) each broadcasting undertaking shall make max- (viii) reflect the multicultural and multiracialimum use, and in no case less than predominant nature of Canada;use, of Canadian creative and other resources in the
(n) where any conflict arises between the objectives ofcreation and presentation of programming, unless
the Corporation set out in paragraphs (l) and (m)the nature of the service provided by the under-
and the interests of any other broadcasting under-taking, such as specialized content or format or the
taking of the Canadian broadcasting system, it shalluse of languages other than French and English,
be resolved in the public interest, and where therenders that use impracticable, in which case the
public interest would be equally served by resolvingundertaking shall make the greatest practicable use
the conflict in favour of either, it shall be resolvedof those resources;
in favour of the objectives set out in paragraphs (l)(g) the programming originated by broadcasting and (m);undertakings should be of high standard;
(o) programming that reflects the aboriginal cultures of(h) all persons who are licensed to carry on broad-
Canada should be provided within the Canadiancasting undertakings have a responsibility for the
broadcasting system as resources become availableprograms they broadcast;
for the purpose;
(i) the programming provided by the Canadian broad-
(p) programming accessible by disabled persons shouldcasting system should
be provided within the Canadian broadcasting
(i) be varied and comprehensive, providing a bal- system as resources become available for the pur-
ance of information, enlightenment and pose;
entertainment for men, women and children of
(q) without limiting any obligation of a broadcastingall ages, interests and tastes,
undertaking to provide the programming contem-
(ii) be drawn from local, regional, national and plated by paragraph (i), alternative television pro-
international sources, gramming services in English and in French should
(iii) include educational and community pro- be provided where necessary to ensure that the full
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graph is made available through the Canadian International Instruments 
broadcasting system;
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
(r) the programming provided by alternative television erty Rights, Annex 1C to G.A.T.T. 1994: Final Act and Agree-
programming services should ment.
(i) be innovative and be complementary to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
programming provided for mass audiences, Works, 9 September 1886, Can. T.S. 1948 No. 22, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, rev. by Paris Act Relating to the Berne Con-(ii) cater to tastes and interests not adequately pro-
vention, 24 July 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.vided for by the programming provided for
mass audiences, and include programming Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 December
devoted to culture and the arts, 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3, 27 I.L.M. 281.
(iii) reflect Canada’s regions and multicultural International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
nature, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations,
26 October 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 67, U.KT.S. 1973 No. 41.(iv) as far as possible, be acquired rather than pro-
duced by those services, and North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Gov-
ernment of Canada, the Government of the United Mex-(v) be made available throughout Canada by the
ican States and the Government of the United States ofmost cost-efficient means;
America, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.(s) private networks and programming undertakings
World Trade Organization, Fourth Protocol to the Generalshould, to an extent consistent with the financial
Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Doc. S/L/20 (30and other resources available to them,
April 1996). World Trade Organization, Fourth Protocol to(i) contribute significantly to the creation and
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Referencepresentation of Canadian programming, and
Paper, (1997) 35 I.L.M. 367.
(ii) be responsive to the evolving demands of the
public; and
International Organization and Government(t) distribution undertakings
Sources (i) should give priority to the carriage of Canadian
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Com-programming services and, in particular, to the
mission, ‘‘Broadcasting Industry at a Glance’’, online: CRTCcarriage of local Canadian stations,
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/ind_broad.htm#codes (date(ii) should provide efficient delivery of program- accessed: 7 May 2003).ming at affordable rates, using the most effec-
Canada, Information Highway Advisory Council, Connec-tive technologies available at reasonable cost,
tion, Community, Content: The Challenge of the Informa-(iii) should, where programming services are sup- tion Highway (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995).plied to them by broadcasting undertakings
Canada, Industry Canada and Competition Bureau,pursuant to contractual arrangements, provide
CRTC/Competition Bureau Interface (19 November 1999),reasonable terms for the carriage, packaging
on l ine :  S t r a t eg i s  h t tp : / / s t r a t eg i s . i c . g c . c a /SSG/and retailing of those programming services,
ct01544e.html (date accessed: 7 May 2003).and
OECD, Canada — Annual Report on Competition Policy(iv) may, where the Commission considers it
Developments in Canada (1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000),appropr iate ,  or ig inate  programming ,
o n l i n e :  O E C D  h t t p : / / w w w . o e c d . o r g /including local programming, on such terms
daf/clp/Annual_reports/1999-00/canada.pdf  (date accessed:as are conducive to the achievement of the
7 May 2003).objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in
this subsection, and in particular provide
access for underserved linguistic and cultural Secondary Sources: Monographs minority communities.
Handa, S., et al., Communications Law in Canada(2) Further declaration. It is further declared that the
(Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2000).Canadian broadcasting system constitutes a single system
Ryan, M., Canadian Telecommunications Law and Regula-and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in
tion (Toronto: Carswell, 1997).subsection (1) can best be achieved by providing for the
regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting
system by a single independent public authority.
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Notes:
1 L.-L. Christians, ‘‘Convergence and Proceduralisation: Generalisation vs. Communications Law in Canada (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2000) at
Contextualisation?’’ (1998) 22 Telecom. Pol’y 255 at 258. para. 3.39.
2 W.H. Melody, ‘‘The Information Society: The Transnational Economic 7 Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38.
Context and Its Implications’’ in G. Sussman & J.A. Lent, eds., Transna- 8 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11.tional Communications: Wiring the Third World (Newbury Park, Calif.:
9 Handa et al., supra note 6 at para. 3.39. See also M. Ryan, CanadianSage Publications, 1991) 27 at 36-37.
Telecommunications Law and Regulation (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at3 Y. Benkler, ‘‘Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribu-
5-2.tion of Control Over Content’’ (1998) 22 Telecom. Pol’y 183 at 184.
10 The objectives of the Canadian Telecommunications Policy are set forth4 See on this point Melody, supra note 2 at 37:
in s. 7 as follows:
It would appear that Third World nations will bear the brunt of the
It is hereby affirmed that telecommunications performs an essentialrisk and instability associated with the exploitation of information
role in the maintenance of Canada’s identity and sovereignty andindustry technologies and markets. As producers in the periphery,
that the Canadian telecommunications policy has as its objectivesthey will have little, if any, control over the product or profit from
their labor and other resources. Moreover, successful global mar- (a) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of
keting by the TNCs requires that Third World leaders be convinced a telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and
to import the latest computer/telecommunications systems. strengthen the social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions;
5 See L.-L. Christians, ‘‘Convergence and Proceduralisation: Generalisation (b) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications ser-
vs. Contextualisation?’’ (1998) 22 Telecom. Pol’y 255 at 257: vices of high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural
areas in all regions of Canada;Faced with the new overlapping due to the phenomenon of conver-
gence, regulation, rather than denying complexity by a discourse of (c) to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the
pure generalisation, must be given the means for a real pluridis- national and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications;
ciplinarity, that is to say, for an articulation among the three poles,
(d) to promote the ownership and control of Canadian carrierseconomic, democratic and technological, reflected not as theoretical
by Canadians;and formal juxtaposition but as a true osmosis, within which no
pole has a pre-established rational priority. The problems linked to (e) to promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities for
this complex intertwining can only be effectively apprehended on telecommunications within Canada and between Canada and
condition of being collectively reconstructed beforehand in the points outside Canada;
enlarged field of all the interested parties. In this way, concretely, we
(f) to foster increased reliance on market forces for the provisioncan revise the regulation of content, certainly by abandoning any
of telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, wheresubstantive conception of the general interest or of what is, for
required, is efficient and effective;example, to be suppressed as ‘‘pornography’’, but also by recon-
structing deliberative procedures which allow these questions to be (g) to stimulate research and development in Canada in the
posed and resolved without it being a question again of opposing field of telecommunications and to encourage innovation in the
sex chatlines, pornographic magazines or broadcasts by giving provision of telecommunications services;
whatever technological or economic diktat as an excuse. This collec- (h) to respond to the economic and social requirements of userstive reconstruction must be democratically inscribed in the partic- of telecommunications services; andular mechanisms enabling all the interested actors, with regard to
(i) to contribute to the protection of the privacy of persons.which the mechanical increase in curbs on market supply and
demand is insufficient. 11 The Broadcasting Policy for Canada is set forth by declaration in s. 3 of
6 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Broadcasting Act, which is cited in the Appendix I to this paper due
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12 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 31 See P. Larouche, ‘‘EC Competition Law and the Convergence of the
Annex 1C to G.A.T.T. 1994: Final Act and Agreement [hereinafter TRIPs]. Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors’’ (1998) 22 Telecom. Pol’y
219 at 219:13 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987, Can.
T.S. 1989 No. 3, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter FTA]. These changes have been reflected in the regulatory framework
applicable to telecommunications and broadcasting, respectively,14 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of
although it is still open to question whether it has evolved suffi-Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Govern-
ciently or rather is still running behind the [technological] develop-ment of the United States of America, 17 December 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
ment of these sectors. Not only have these advances brought major[hereinafter NAFTA].
changes to the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, they
15 General Agreement on Trade in Services, see discussion in Handa et al., have also all but erased the technological frontier between them, a
supra note 6 at paras. 2.143ff. phenomenon now known as convergence. The Internet provides a
ready example of what convergence can lead to in practice, and it is16 World Trade Organization, Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement
often said that it constitutes a scale-model (on a narrow-band basis)on Trade in Services, WTO Doc. S/L/20 (30 April 1996) [hereinafter
of what awaits us in the not-so-distant future. Just like the transfor-BTA].
mation of each of these two sectors had to be echoes in the regula-
17 See e.g., International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Pro- tory framework, their convergence must also have legal conse-
ducers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 26 October quences; indeed, it puts into question the very notion of
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 67, U.KT.S. 1973 No. 41. ‘‘telecommunications’’ and ‘‘broadcasting’’ as discrete phenomena
which can be addressed and governed by a specific regulatory18 CRTC, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 99-14/Broadcasting Public Notice
framework in order to achieve certain ends.CRTC 1999-94 [hereinafter New Media Report].
32 Clements, supra note 27 at 199-200.19 CRTC, Public Notice, CRTC 1999-197 [hereinafter New Media Deci-
sion]. Discussion of the new Media Decision herein incorporates the 33 See Larouche, supra note 31 at 241-42:
reasons set forth in the New Media Report, ibid.
Competition law is often presented as a laboratory for regulation: as20 Handa et al., supra note 6 at para. 12.150. cases arise, problems are identified and solutions put forward, which
can then be turned into a regulatory framework applicable to the21 See R.M. Frieden, ‘‘Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
whole sector.Regulatory Models Diverge’’ (2000) 13 Harv. J. Law & Tech 395 at 431:
34 C. Scott, ‘‘The Proceduralization of Telecommunications Law’’ (1998) 22Any attempt to extend regulatory regimes to Internet-mediated
Telecom. Pol’y 243 at 245.applications runs the risk of creating a dichotomy in regulatory
rights and responsibilities between providers of functionally 35 See W.T. Stanbury, ‘‘Competition Policy and the Regulation of Telecom-
equivalent services.. . . The development of Internet-mediated ser- munications in Canada’’ in W.T. Stanbury, ed., Perspectives on the New
vices presents a regulatory challenge to governments, particularly to Economics and Regulation of Telecommunications (Montreal: Institute
those governments disinclined to treat the new services as for Research in Public Policy, 1996) 103 at 103. For a more detailed
equivalent to services transmitted and delivered via traditional analysis of market power in the ‘‘information economy’’, see R.F.D.
media. The juxtaposition of different regulatory regimes typically Corley, ‘‘The Competition Act and the Information Economy’’ in J.B.
creates an asymmetry that has the potential to tilt the competitive Musgrove, Competition Law for the 21st Century: Papers of the Cana-
playing field in favor of the less-regulated service. To the extent that dian Bar Association Competition Law Section 1997 Annual Conference
regulation imposes financial and operational burdens, the service (Aylmer, Qc: Juris Publishing, 1997) 143.
provider subject to greater regulation typically finds itself at a com-
36 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.petitive disadvantage to a less heavily regulated operator. Govern-
ments need a compelling justification to establish different regula- 37 Handa et al., supra note 6 at para. 15.67.tory regimes in view of the potential for such an asymmetry to affect
38 Ibid. at para. 15.11.the relative attractiveness of different services in the marketplace.
22 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. 39 Ibid.
23 Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2002 40 Ibid. at paras. 15.5, 15.13.
(assented to 12 December 2002, S.C. 2002, c. 26). The bill was originally 41 Frieden, supra note 21 at 431.introduced in the 1st session of the 37th Parliament as Bill C-48, but died
on the Order Paper when Parliament was prorogued on 16 September 42 See Scott, supra note 34 at 251:
2002. By motion adopted 7 October 2002, the House of Commons
It is said that what is now required is ‘‘technology neutral law’’.provided for the reintroduction in the 2nd session of legislation that had
Globalization of telecommunications services has created pressurenot received Royal Assent.
on nation states to reduce the restrictiveness of national regimes,
24 CRTC, Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2003-02 [hereinafter Internet while at the same time supranational institutions (such as the EU
Retransmission Notice]. and WTO) have sought to expand their competence into telecom-
munications, and have inevitably based their regimes on the most25 Ibid. at para. 79.
general possible norms so as to permit their widest possible applica-26 For more information regarding Internet retransmission and its regula- tion. The deployment of such generalized norms is consistent with a
tion in both Canada and the U.S., see S. Handa, ‘‘Retransmission of broad conception of subsidiarity as applied at EU level (and implic-
Television Broadcasts on the Internet’’ (2001) 8 Sw. J. of L. & Trade Am. itly by the WTO), and permit a degree of regulatory competition
39. between jurisdictions seeking to encourage inward investment in
communications infrastructures. Further pressure for generalization27 See B. Clements, ‘‘The Impact of Convergence on Regulatory Policy in
of norms arises from the use of a principle of reciprocity as the basisEurope’’ (1998) 22 Telecom. Pol’y 197 at 203:
for bilateral agreement on access for foreign companies to national
The balance between ex-ante sector-specific regulation and the telecommunications markets.
application of a posteriori competition rules was a recurrent theme
43 OECD, Canada — Annual Report on Competition Policy Developmentsof the debate leading to the full liberalization of telecommunica-
in Canada (1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000), online: OECD http://tions services and infrastructure. At that time, there was general
www.oecd.org/daf/clp/Annual_reports/1999-00/canada.pdf (dateconsensus that increasing dependence on competition rules, accom-
accessed: 7 May 2003) at 15.panied by a progressive reduction of ex-ante regulation, would be a
feature of the post-1998 environment. 44 See the discussion of the alternatives in a speech by then Deputy Secre-
tary-General of the OECD, Joanna R. Shelton, ‘‘Competition Policy:28 T.G. Kane, ‘‘Recent Case Law, Regulatory and Policy Developments in
What Chance for International Rules?’’ (Wilton Park Conference 545, 25the Canadian Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors’’ online:
November 1998), online: OECD http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/Speeches/Lexpert Articles on Recent Legal Developments (2000) http://
JS-WILTO.htm (date accessed: 7 May 2003). See also A. Gates, ‘‘Conver-www.lexpert.ca (date accessed: 7 May 2003).
gence and Competition: Technological Change, Industry Concentration29 Ibid. and Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Sector’’ (2000) U.T.
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competition policy ‘‘across sectors and across national borders so as to 52 See e.g. Gates, supra note 44 at 118-19: ‘‘The way forward may be to
maximize competitive opportunities and minimize anti-competitive develop more focused investment review provisions, rather than to per-
behaviour’’. petuate foreign ownership restrictions that have only incidental and
unpredictable effects on competition’’.45 Gates, ibid. at 119.
46 J. van Cuilenburg & P. Verhoest, ‘‘Free and Equal Access: In Search of 53 See the Industry self-regulatory Codes listed online at: Canadian Radio-
Policy Models for Converging Communication Systems’’ (1998) 22 television and Telecommunications Commission, ‘‘Broadcasting Industry
Telecom. Pol’y 171. a t  a  Glance ’ ’ ,  on l ine :  CRTC ht tp : / /www.c r t c . gc . ca /eng/
ind_broad.htm#codes (date accessed: 7 May 2003).47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. at 177. 54 See Melody, supra note 2 at 35:
49 Ibid. at 178.
As TNCs [trans-national corporations] expand through the use of50 See e.g. P. Nihoul, ‘‘Competition or Regulation for Multimedia?’’ (1998) the information technologies, they can reduce their dependency
22 Telecom. Pol’y 207 at 213: upon any single resource supply or production location, thereby
enhancing their negotiating power with individual governments,Another example [in EC law] concerns the obligation for dominant
unions, and other groups. A higher proportion of risk can be trans-firms to share essential resources with the participants in a given
ferred to the resource supplier and producing regions. This can bemarket — despite the fact that they may be competitors. . . . It has
done by means of pressures: (a) for subsidies, tax concessions, andnow been recognised as a landmark for the application of competi-
regulations conferring special privileges or even government promo-tion rules to interconnection agreements. The essential-resource
tion of TNC interest; (b) for the maintenance of a labor force ofdoctrine does not enhance market freedom. The best way to
specialized skills at low wages in the face of unstable employment;describe it is probably to refer to a nationalisation or an expropria-
(c) for exemption from social controls, such as health and environ-tion of a competitive advantage acquired or developed by a com-
mental standards; and/or (d) for a privileged position in thepany: all participants in the given market are allowed to share in the
domestic market of the peripheral producing nations.resources acquired or developed by the firm.
51 S. Globerman, ‘‘The Economics of the Information Superhighway’’ in T.J. 55 See Gates, supra note 44 at 117-18.
Courchane, ed., Technology, Information and Public Policy: Proceedings
of a Conference Held at Queen’s University 17-18 November 1994 56 See text accompanying note 16, above.
(Kingston, Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy,
1995) 243 at 256. 57 Clements, supra note 27 at 203.
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